Is not the same reason available in theology and in politics?...Will you follow truth but to a certain point?—Burke'sVindication of Natural Society.
The first author who stated fairly the connexion between theevidence of testimony and the evidence of experience, was Hume, inhis Essay on Miracles; a work abounding in maxims of great use inthe conduct of life.—Edinburgh Review, Sept. 1814, p. 328.
Several of the readers of this little work (first published in 1819)have derived much amusement from the mistakes of others respecting itsnature and object. It has been by some represented as a seriousattempt to inculcate universal scepticism; while others haveconsidered it as a jeu d'esprit, &c.[1] The author does not, however,design to entertain his readers with accounts of the mistakes which,have arisen respecting it; because many of them, he is convinced,would be received with incredulity; and he could not, without anindelicate exposure of individuals, verify his anecdotes.
But some sensible readers have complained of the difficulty ofdetermining what they are to believe. Of the existence of[Pg 4]Buonaparte, indeed, they remained fully convinced; nor, if it wereleft doubtful, would any important results ensue; but if they can giveno satisfactory reason for their conviction, how can they know, itis asked, that they may not be mistaken as to other points of greaterconsequence, on which they are no less fully convinced, but on whichall men are not agreed? The author has accordingly been solicited toendeavour to frame some canons which may furnish a standard fordetermining what evidence is to be received.
This he conceives to be impracticable, except to that extent to whichit is accomplished by a sound system of Logic; including under thattitle, a portion—that which relates to the "Laws of Evidence"—ofwhat is sometimes treated under the head of "Rhetoric." But the fulland complete accomplishment of such an object would confer on Man theunattainable attribute of infallibility.
But the difficulty complained of, he conceives to arise, in manyinstances, from men's mis-stating the grounds of their ownconviction. They are convinced, indeed, and perhaps with verysufficient reason; but they imagine this reason to be a different onefrom what it is. The evidence to which they have assented is appliedto their minds in a different manner from that in which they believethat it is—and suppose that it ought to be—applied. And whenchallenged to defend and justify their own belief, they feel at aloss, because they are attempting to maintain a position which is[Pg 5]not, in fact, that in which their force lies.
For a development of the nature, the consequences, and the remedies ofthis mistake, the reader is referred to "Hinds on Inspiration," pp.30-46. If such a development is to