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Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS
(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)
Translated by R. H. M. Elwes
I. By that which is 'self-caused' I mean that of which theessence involves existence, or that of which the nature is onlyconceivable as existent.
II. A thing is called 'finite after its kind' when it can belimited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a bodyis called finite because we always conceive another greater body.So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body isnot limited by thought, nor a thought by body.
III. By 'substance' I mean that which is in itself, and isconceived through itself: in other words, that of which aconception can be formed independently of any other conception.
IV. By 'attribute' I mean that which the intellect perceives asconstituting the essence of substance.
V. By 'mode' I mean the modifications ("affectiones") ofsubstance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through,something other than itself.
VI. By 'God' I mean a being absolutely infinite—that is, asubstance consisting in infinite attributes, of which eachexpresses eternal and infinite essentiality.
>>>>>Explanation—I say absolutely infinite, not infinite afterits kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infiniteattributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite,contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involvesno negation.
VII. That thing is called 'free,' which exists solely by thenecessity of its own nature, and of which the action isdetermined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing isnecessary, or rather constrained, which is determined bysomething external to itself to a fixed and definite method ofexistence or action.
VIII. By 'eternity' I mean existence itself, in so far as it isconceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition ofthat which is eternal.
>>>>>Explanation—Existence of this kind is conceived as aneternal truth, like the essence of a thing and, therefore,cannot be explained by means of continuance or time, thoughcontinuance may be conceived without a beginning or end.
AXIOMS. I. Everything which exists, exists either in itself orin something else.
II. That which cannot be conceived through anything else must beconceived through itself.
III. From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows;and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it isimpossible that an effect can follow.
IV. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves theknowledge of a cause.
V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, theone by means of the other; the conception of one does not involvethe conception of the other.
VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.
VII. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essencedoes not involve existence.
PROPOSITIONS. I. Substance is by nature prior to itsmodifications.
>>>>>Proof—This is clear from Deff. iii. and v.
II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, havenothing in common.
>>>>>Proof—Also evident from Def. iii. For each must exist initse